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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982,
1
 it intended to cre-
ate a court of appeals.
2
  Little did it know that it also was creating a quasi-
administrative agency that would engage in substantive rulemaking and set 
policy in a manner substantially similar to administrative agencies.
3
  In this 
Article, I examine the Federal Circuit‟s practices when it orders a case to be 
heard en banc and illustrate how these practices cause the Federal Circuit to 
look like an administrative agency engaging in substantive rulemaking.  The 
  
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  For helpful 
comments, I thank the participants at the Missouri Law Review Symposium on Evolv-
ing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its Patent Law Jurisprudence, as 
well as Elizabeth Reilly, Sarah Cravens, Bill Jordan, Kyle Passmore, and Hiram Me-
léndez-Juarbe.  I am especially grateful to Dennis Crouch for inviting me to partici-
pate at the Symposium. 
 1. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 
25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 2. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra Part III. 
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number and breadth of questions the Federal Circuit agrees to hear en banc 
and the means by which it hears them go beyond the limited role of a court – 
to decide the case before it.
4
  Instead of exercising restraint and addressing 
only what it must, the Federal Circuit raises wide-ranging questions and 
makes broad pronouncements of law that set or change patent policy.
5
   
Congress traditionally has delegated policy setting to administrative 
agencies that must comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
6
 
particularly the notice and comment provisions.
7
  Despite being an appellate 
court not subject to the notice and comment requirements,
8
 the Federal Cir-
cuit appears to comply with these requirements when it orders cases to be 
heard en banc.
9
 
And although some commentators object to the en banc Federal Circuit 
acting like an administrative agency by engaging in substantive rulemaking 
and policy setting, I argue that the Federal Circuit is in the best position to do 
so.  However, other governmental bodies can and should play a larger role in 
shaping patent policy.
10
 
Part II of this Article describes the Federal Circuit‟s en banc practices 
since its creation in 1982, focusing on how the Federal Circuit compares to 
the other federal appellate courts in terms of the frequency of en banc deci-
sions, how the Federal Circuit orders cases to be heard en banc, the number 
and scope of the questions presented for en banc consideration, and the use of 
amici curiae in the briefing stages of the case.   Part III examines the Federal 
Circuit‟s en banc practices in light of how administrative agencies engage in 
substantive rulemaking under the APA and suggests that the Federal Circuit‟s 
en banc practices mimic those of administrative agencies.  Part IV then takes 
a normative look at the en banc Federal Circuit by analyzing objections to its 
en banc practices.  In response, Part IV evaluates alternatives to the Federal 
Circuit for directing patent policy and evaluates whether these alternative 
bodies are better suited than the Federal Circuit sitting en banc. 
  
 4. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case 
or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 303-04 (1979). 
 5. See infra Part IV.C.5. 
 6. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (cod-
ified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-59, 701-06 (2006)); 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 
Supp. 2011). 
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 8. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (“„[A]gency‟ . . . does not include . . . the courts of the 
United States . . . .”). 
 9. See infra notes 70-91 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Part IV.C. 
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II.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT EN BANC  
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
11
 
to serve as the appellate body for cases “arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to patents”
12
 and appeals stemming from decisions of the Patent and 
Trademark Office‟s (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences “with 
respect to patent applications and interferences.”
13
  Proponents of the Federal 
Circuit‟s creation hoped that channeling patent cases to a single appellate 
body would result in a uniform patent law with increased certainty and pre-
dictability that would “foster technological growth and industrial innova-
tion.”
14
 
But despite its specialized subject matter and unique jurisdiction, the 
Federal Circuit is, at the end of the day, a federal appellate court like other 
regional circuit courts.  Its purpose is to resolve disputes between parties by 
interpreting and applying the law.  Likewise, the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and other federal legislation empower and restrict the Federal Cir-
cuit.
15
 
One such power appellate courts possess is the ability to hear cases en 
banc.
16
  Although three-judge panels decide most cases before circuit courts, 
the full court of active service judges within the circuit and senior judges who 
served on the three-judge panel deciding the case may convene to hear and 
decide the case together.
17
  Once decided, the en banc court‟s ruling becomes 
the decision and the earlier panel‟s decision is vacated.
18
  However, en banc 
  
 11. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 
25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (granting the Federal Circuit “exclusive 
jurisdiction” over appeals in cases where a district court‟s jurisdiction “was based, in 
whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title”); id. § 1338(a) (2006) (granting district 
courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under an Act of Congress relat-
ing to patents”).  But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 
535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (holding that a counter-claim is insufficient to “arise[] un-
der” an Act of Congress relating to patents), vacating 13 F. App‟x 961 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988) (hold-
ing that a defense based on patent law did not constitute a case “aris[ing] under” an 
Act of Congress relating to patents). 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A); see also 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006). 
 14. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 25, 1982), in 94 F.R.D. 347, 358; see 
also Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2056-59 
(2007). 
 15. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 16. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
 17. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant 
En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 213-214 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). 
 18. George, supra note 17, at 214.  
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decisions make up only a small percentage of appellate decisions.
19
  Nonethe-
less, en banc hearings and decisions are important as they are reserved for 
situations involving significant value.  In particular, an en banc hearing “will 
not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or 
maintain uniformity of the court‟s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a 
question of exceptional importance.”
20
  As Judge Douglas Ginsburg has 
pointed out, the latter standard of “„exceptional importance‟ is in the eye of 
the beholder,” and therefore it “expresses more of an attitude than a stand-
ard.”
21
 
The Federal Circuit has, like all of the circuit courts, ordered cases to be 
heard before it en banc.  The remainder of this section examines the Federal 
Circuit‟s en banc presence by examining the proportion of the Federal Cir-
cuit‟s docket that is heard en banc, how often the Federal Circuit orders en 
banc hearings sua sponte, the number and scope of the questions presented to 
the Federal Circuit for en banc consideration, and the use of amici curiae in 
the briefing stage of en banc review. 
A.  Disproportionality of the Federal Circuit’s En Banc Practice 
Since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has ordered en banc hear-
ings in forty-six patent cases.
22
  The Federal Circuit‟s en banc cases represent 
0.10% of the total number of cases terminated from 1982-2010.
23
  When not 
  
 19. Id. at 214 n.5 (citing to several studies showing that en banc decisions make 
up a small percentage of circuit courts‟ caseloads and decisions). 
 20. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
 21. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1022 (1991). 
 22. See Appendix for the list of cases.  These cases do not include those where 
the Federal Circuit vacated a panel‟s decision and had the panel replace its earlier 
decision with another decision by the same panel.  See, e.g., Elan Pharms., Inc. v. 
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).  
These cases also do not include those where the Federal Circuit decided to hear the 
case en banc, but subsequently decided not to hear it en banc.  See, e.g., Sun Studs, 
Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 892 F.2d 73 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 23. The 0.10% calculation uses the forty-four cases that were heard en banc 
before 2011 (i.e., all cases in the Appendix except for Akamai Tech., Inc. v. MIT 
and McKesson Tech. Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp.).  The total number of cases ter-
minated that was used in this calculation was the sum of the total cases terminat-
ed during the calendar years ending on December 31 from 1982 through 2010.  
See generally Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. COURTS, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx [here-
inafter Caseload Statistics] (last visited June 11, 2011) (for 2001-2010); Statisti-
cal Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. COURTS, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary.aspx 
[hereinafter Statistical Tables] (last visited June 11, 2011) (for 2001-2010); see 
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counting the cases that had not been decided yet en banc during this period
24
 
or were not decided en banc at all,
25
 the number of cases drops to forty, which 
represents 0.09% of the total cases.  However, this total number of cases ter-
minated is not limited to patent cases.  The Federal Circuit also has jurisdic-
tion to hear cases involving international trade, government contracts, trade-
marks, claims against the U.S. government, veterans‟ benefits, and others.
26
  
In fact, only about one-third of the Federal Circuit‟s docket is comprised of 
patent cases.  From 2006 through 2010, patent cases comprised 28% to 42% 
of the Federal Circuit‟s docket, averaging 33%.
27
  By reducing the total num-
ber of cases terminated proportional to the average number of patent cases 
  
also Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period End-
ing December 31, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT, (Table B-8 (for 1991-
2010), Table A (for 1986-1990), and Table 1 (for 1982-1985)).  The only excep-
tions were 1992 and 1993, which used the total number of cases terminated dur-
ing the twelve month period ending on March 31 of the subsequent year.  See 
Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ending 
March 31, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT (Table B-8 (for 1993-1994)); Case-
load Statistics, supra; Statistical Tables, supra.  Although a small handful (six) of 
the patent en banc cases used were not terminated en banc during this period or 
were withdrawn before decision, the reason for using this benchmark for the de-
nominator is that similar data is available for comparison purposes to other U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.  See Caseload Statistics, supra; Statistical Tables, supra. 
 24. E.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. 2008-1511, 2008-
1512, 2008-1513, 2008-1514, 2008-1595, 2011 WL 2028255 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 
2011) (en banc); TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. MIT, Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1417, 2009-1380, 2009-
1416, 2011 WL 1518090 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2011) (decision pending); McKesson 
Tech. Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 WL 2173401 (Fed. Cir. May 
26, 2011) (decision pending). 
 25. E.g., Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated by 328 F. App‟x 
658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); King Instrument Corp. v. Perego, 72 F.3d 855 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (not decided en banc because Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 
1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) was decided en banc and answered the questions there). 
 26. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011). 
 27. See Appeals Filed, by Category, FY 2006, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/ChartFilings 
06.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011); Appeals Filed, by Category, FY 2007, U.S. CT. OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-
court/statistics/ChartFilings07.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011); Appeals Filed, by 
Category, FY 2008, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http:// 
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/ChartFilings08.pdf (last 
visited June 11, 2011); Appeals Filed, by Category, FY 2009, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court 
/statistics/ChartFilings09.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011); Appeals Filed, by Category, 
FY 2010, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,  http://www.cafc.uscourts.  
gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/Caseload_by_Category_Appeals_Filed_2010 
.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011).  
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constituting the Federal Circuit‟s docket the percentage of en banc cases rep-
resents 0.32% (counting forty-four cases) and 0.29% (if counting only forty 
cases) of the total cases. 
Looking only at the data from 2001-2009, the percentages for the Feder-
al Circuit are 0.30% (counting all cases ordered to be heard en banc (14)) and 
0.23% (counting only cases decided en banc (11)).
28
  To put these percent-
ages in perspective, from 2001-2009, the other U.S. Courts of Appeals aver-
aged 0.10% of en banc cases, with a range of 0.01% to 0.23%.  The specific 
breakdown of the other circuit courts is below.
29
 
 
Sorted By Circuit  Sorted by Percentage 
Court 
En Banc 
Cases Court 
En Banc 
Cases 
D.C. Circuit 0.15% Second Circuit 0.01% 
First Circuit 0.10% Eleventh Circuit 0.07% 
Second Circuit 0.01% Seventh Circuit 0.07% 
Third Circuit 0.07% Third Circuit 0.07% 
Fourth Circuit 0.09% Fifth Circuit 0.08% 
Fifth Circuit 0.08% Fourth Circuit 0.09% 
Sixth Circuit 0.13% First Circuit 0.10% 
Seventh Circuit 0.07% Sixth Circuit 0.13% 
Eighth Circuit 0.23% Ninth Circuit 0.14% 
Ninth Circuit 0.14% D.C. Circuit 0.15% 
Tenth Circuit 0.19% Tenth Circuit 0.19% 
Eleventh Circuit 0.07% Eighth Circuit 0.23% 
 
Based on this comparison, the Federal Circuit appears to decide more 
cases en banc than does any other circuit.
30
  One could argue that because the 
  
 28. See Appendix for the list of cases ordered to be heard en banc and cases 
decided en banc.  The total number of cases terminated by the Federal Circuit from 
2001-2009 is 14,270, see Statistical Tables, supra note 23, and estimating that 33% 
were patent cases, see sources cited supra note 27; this yields 4,709 patent cases ter-
minated from 2001-2009. 
 29. These percentages were calculated by using the total number of en banc 
cases terminated from 2001-2009 as the numerator.  See The Judicial Business of the 
United States Courts of the Seventh Circuit, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT (2010), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/rpt/statistics.htm.  The 
denominator was calculated using the total number of cases terminated from 2001-
2009 as reported by the U.S. Courts‟ Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary.  See 
Statistical Tables, supra note 23. 
 30. But see Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal 
Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 816-17 
(2010) (finding the Federal Circuit has a lower rate of en banc cases than some other 
circuits, but using a different methodology for calculating the rate and not limiting the 
study to patent cases in the Federal Circuit). 
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active judges on the Federal Circuit sit in only one location,
31
 the court is in a 
better position to hear cases en banc than the regional circuits whose judges 
are spread over a larger geographic area.
32
  Although the relative convenience 
of sitting en banc may explain some of the differences between the Federal 
Circuit and the regional circuits, it does not explain the difference between 
the Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, which also sits in only one loca-
tion.
33
 
B.  The Federal Circuit Acting Sua Sponte 
Another interesting aspect of the Federal Circuit‟s en banc practice is 
the number of times the Federal Circuit has sua sponte ordered a case to be 
heard en banc.  Of the forty-six cases the Federal Circuit ordered to be heard 
en banc, I have found documentation for thirty-nine of the cases indicating 
whether one or more of the parties petitioned for the en banc order or whether 
the Federal Circuit sua sponte ordered the en banc hearing.
34
  Of these thirty-
nine cases, the Federal Circuit has ordered en banc hearings sua sponte in 
twenty-two of them (56%).
35
  Even assuming one or more of the parties peti-
tioned for an en banc hearing in the remaining seven cases, the result is that 
the Federal Circuit sua sponte ordered 48% of the en banc cases, a surprising-
ly high number.  As discussed infra, the significance of the Federal Circuit‟s 
sua sponte usage of en banc orders is important in understanding how the 
Federal Circuit establishes broad patent rules on its own initiative and acts 
more like a policymaker than an adjudicator.
36
 
  
 31. See Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited June 17, 
2011) (stating that the court is located and court sessions are generally held in Wash-
ington, D.C.).  
 32. See, e.g., Courtroom Information, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/ (last visited June 17, 2011) (stating that oral 
arguments may be heard in both St. Louis, Missouri and St. Paul, Minnesota). 
 33. See E. Barrett Prettyman United States Courthouse and William B. Bryant 
Annex, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov 
/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Courthouse+-+Directions+and+Map2 (last visited 
June 17, 2011) (listing the location of the sole courthouse in Washington, D.C.). 
 34. There are seven cases for which such information could not be found.  See 
DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006), Festo Corp. v. Sho-
ketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003), Nobelpharma 
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998), Beatrice Foods Co. 
v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1990), Wy-
den v. Comm‟r of Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934 (Fed. Cir. 1986), Paulik v. 
Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and Gardner v. TEC Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 35. See Appendix. 
 36. See infra text accompanying note 98. 
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C.  The Scope of the Questions 
More striking and more important than the number of en banc cases the 
Federal Circuit orders and how they are ordered are the number and scope of 
the questions the en banc court hears.  Of the Federal Circuit‟s forty-six en 
banc cases, I have obtained the en banc orders or other supporting documen-
tation in twenty-five of them which indicate the number of questions that the 
en banc court would address.  Of these twenty-five cases, seventy-seven 
questions have been addressed to the court en banc.
37
  These numbers repre-
sent an average of 3.1 questions per case.
38
  Assuming only one question was 
asked in each of the twenty-one remaining cases, the total number of ques-
tions posed becomes ninety-eight, with an average of 2.1 questions per case.
39
   
In the past decade, the number of questions in en banc orders has in-
creased.  Of the seventy-seven questions that the Federal Circuit definitely 
asked in its twenty-nine year history, fifty-three (69%) are from orders the 
court issued from 1999-2011, with an average of 3.5 questions per case or 2.9 
questions per case assuming one question per case for the cases without doc-
umentation.  Thus, the Federal Circuit, as of late, is being asked – either by 
itself or by the parties – to sit en banc to answer an increasing number of 
questions concerning patent law. 
Despite the sheer number of questions the en banc Federal Circuit poses, 
the most striking feature of the en banc orders is their scope.  The questions 
presented to the Federal Circuit address a wide variety of issues related to a 
particular doctrine or statutory requirement.  For example, in Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., the Federal Circuit asked for additional briefs directed to the following 
seven questions: 
1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by refer-
encing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and 
similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the 
patentee‟s use of the term in the specification?  If both sources are to 
be consulted, in what order? 
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpre-
tation, should the specification limit the full scope of claim language 
(as defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has acted as his 
own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear disclaimer 
of claim scope?  If so, what language in the specification will satisfy 
those conditions?  What use should be made of general as opposed to 
  
 37. This count is based on how the Federal Circuit numbers the questions.  The 
actual number of questions is higher because some questions actually contain several 
questions.  See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 40 (Question 2) (listing five ques-
tions as one). 
 38. Seventy-seven questions divided by twenty-five cases. 
 39. Ninety-eight questions divided by forty-six cases. 
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technical dictionaries?  How does the concept of ordinary meaning 
apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term?  If 
the dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a 
term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to determine what 
definition or definitions should apply? 
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specifica-
tion, what use should be made of dictionaries?  Should the range of the 
ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the in-
vention disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a single 
embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth are dis-
closed? 
4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the ma-
jority and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, 
conflicting approaches, should the two approaches be treated as com-
plementary methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on claim 
scope, and a patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in or-
der to establish the claim coverage it seeks? 
5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the 
sole purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 
and 112? 
6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one 
of ordinary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the dis-
puted claim terms?; and 
7. Consistent with the Supreme Court‟s decision in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. 
v. FAS Technologies, Inc., is it appropriate for this court to accord any 
deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings?  If so, 
on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?
40
 
 
The order in Phillips attempts to leave no stone unturned with respect to 
claim construction.  The Federal Circuit posed questions concerning the tools 
to be used in claim construction, how claim construction should relate to the 
requirements for patent protection, and the deference accorded to the lower 
courts.
41
 
Similarly, in Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., the Federal Circuit 
requested briefs on the following six questions: 
  
 40. 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Circ. 2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (order 
granting petition for rehearing en banc). 
 41. See id. 
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1. Should the materiality-intent-balancing framework for inequitable 
conduct be modified or replaced? 
2. If so, how?  In particular, should the standard be tied directly to 
fraud or unclean hands?  If so, what is the appropriate standard for 
fraud or unclean hands? 
3. What is the proper standard for materiality?  What role should the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office‟s rules play in defining 
materiality?  Should a finding of materiality require that but for the al-
leged misconduct, one or more claims would not have issued? 
4. Under what circumstances is it proper to infer intent from materiali-
ty?  
5. Should the balancing inquiry (balancing materiality and intent) be 
abandoned?[; and] 
6. Whether the standards for materiality and intent in other federal 
agency contexts or at common law shed light on the appropriate 
standards to be applied in the patent context.
42
 
The order in Therasense is also a seemingly comprehensive list of ques-
tions relating to the doctrine of inequitable conduct.  The court entertains the 
possibility of abandoning its prior tests or standards concerning inequitable 
conduct but also considers how best to structure the replacement for this void 
or partial void, including how the factors of this test will operate and how 
they relate to other approaches to similar issues. 
Even en banc orders with fewer questions have broad inquiries.  For ex-
ample, in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Federal Circuit 
posed two questions: 
1. Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written descrip-
tion requirement separate from an enablement requirement? [; and] 
2. If a separate written description requirement is set forth in the stat-
ute, what is the scope and purpose of the requirement?
43
 
Although the court‟s order contained only two questions, the scope of 
the questions was broad and substantial.
44
  Does an element of patentability 
that was thought to be required actually exist?  And, if it does exist, why does 
  
 42. 374 F. App‟x 35, 35-36 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 
 43. 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (order granting petition 
for rehearing en banc). 
 44. See id. 
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it exist and how does it work?  In short, the Federal Circuit is not addressing a 
single, narrow issue that will dispose of the case.  Instead, it is crafting rules 
about many of the details constituting a particular legal doctrine. 
D.  Amici Curiae Briefing in the Federal Circuit 
The final aspect of the Federal Circuit‟s en banc practice to examine is 
its use of amici curiae in the briefing stages.  The Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure allow for amici curiae to file briefs but require leave of the court or 
consent of all parties.
45
  Unless the court grants leave in its en banc order, 
amici curiae first must file a motion for leave or go through the process of 
obtaining consent of the parties before filing a brief.
46
  Many of the Federal 
Circuit‟s recent orders permit amici curiae to file briefs without leave of 
court.
47
  In some cases, the Federal Circuit specifically invites the United 
States or the PTO to file an amicus brief.
48
  A survey of recent en banc orders 
from other circuits reveals that other circuits do not use similar language re-
garding amici.
49
  While these other circuits may permit amici to file briefs in 
  
 45. FED. R. APP. P. 29(a). 
 46. Id.  
 47. E.g., Therasense, Inc., 374 F. App‟x at 36 (“[A]ny such amicus briefs may be 
filed without leave of court . . . .”); TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Corp., 376 F. App‟x 21, 22 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Briefs of amici curiae will be entertained, and any 
such amicus briefs may be filed without leave of court . . . .”); Hyatt v. Kappos, 366 
F. App‟x 170, 171 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Briefs of amici curiae will be enter-
tained, and any such amicus briefs may be filed without leave of court . . . .”); Princo 
Corp. v. ITC, 583 F.3d 1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“Briefs of amici 
curiae will be entertained, and any such amicus briefs may be filed without leave of 
court . . . .”); Ariad, 595 F.3d at 1330 (“[A]ny such amicus briefs may be filed without 
leave of court . . . .”); In re Bilski, 264 F. App‟x 896, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curi-
am) (“[Amicus] briefs may be filed without leave of court . . . .”); Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“Amicus curiae briefs 
may be filed by bar associations, trade or industry associations, government entities, 
and other interested parties.”) (italics omitted). 
 48. E.g., Therasense, Inc., 374 F. App‟x at 36 (“The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office is invited to participate as amicus curiae.”); Ariad, 595 F.3d at 
1330 (“The United States is invited to submit an amicus brief.”); Phillips, 376 F.3d at 
1383-84 (“In particular, the United States Patent and Trademark Office is invited to 
submit an amicus curiae brief.”) (italics omitted). 
 49. See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 628 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 2010) (no language 
regarding amici; implying amici must file for leave or obtain the consent of the par-
ties); Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 623 F.3d 
1054 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Skoien, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 
1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010) (same); United States v. Cobb, 595 F.3d 1202 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (same); Greenberg v. Nat‟l Geographic Soc‟y, 497 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 
2007) (same); see also United States v. Textron, Inc., 560 F.3d 513 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(“Amici are welcome to file amicus briefs, also not to exceed 20 pages per brief, on 
the same schedule, but must seek leave of court.”) (emphasis added). 
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the case, the recurring invitation to amici to file briefs in the Federal Circuit‟s 
en banc cases suggests a stronger attitude of inclusiveness than exists in the 
other circuits.   
The Federal Circuit‟s rationale for liberally allowing amicus briefs 
comes as no surprise.  It seeks to benefit from the advice of those with 
knowledge of patent law and the advancement of technologies.
50
  That is, the 
Federal Circuit seems to rely on this practice of soliciting the views of stake-
holders so it can make informed decisions on how to shape and interpret pa-
tent law, taking multiple viewpoints and interests into consideration.  
III.  ANALOGIZING TO ADMINISTRATIVE SUBSTANTIVE RULEMAKING 
As discussed in Part II, the Federal Circuit sitting en banc has many dis-
tinct features.  This Part examines the Federal Circuit‟s en banc practices in 
light of administrative agencies‟ substantive rulemaking procedures and ar-
gues that when the Federal Circuit sits en banc, it acts similarly to an admin-
istrative agency. 
In today‟s administrative state, agencies engage in a variety of functions, 
one of which is to issue substantive legislative rules when Congress has dele-
gated its policymaking duties to the agency.  As the Supreme Court described 
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: 
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally 
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and 
the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by 
Congress.  If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative regula-
tions are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute.  Sometimes the legislative dele-
gation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than ex-
plicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency. 
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded 
to an executive department‟s construction of a statutory scheme it is 
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administra-
tive interpretations has been consistently followed by this Court 
whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved 
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force 
of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more 
  
 50. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (New-
man, J., dissenting). 
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than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency 
regulations.
51
 
As acknowledged by the Court in Chevron, Congress cannot and does 
not always address all policy considerations when it legislates.
52
  The main 
reasons for Congress‟s failure to address every policy consideration in its 
legislation include lack of expertise in the area, lack of time, and lack of fore-
sight to address future issues that may develop.
53
  When authorized by Con-
gress, agencies are either required or permitted to develop substantive rules 
and consequently set policy to fill these gaps.
54
  For example, in Chevron, 
Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require the states to regulate “„new or 
modified major stationary sources‟ of air pollution.”
55
  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a regulation allowing the states to 
define “stationary source” as a collection of pollution-emitting devices all 
within the same single “bubble.”
56
  The Supreme Court held that the EPA‟s 
interpretation was a permissible construction of the legislation and would not 
allow the D.C. Circuit to substitute its policy judgment.
57
 
The Patent Act, although specific in some instances,
58
 is a broadly 
worded act leaving several policy voids.
59
  Prime examples of these voids 
include section 101‟s categories of patentable subject matter
60
 and section 
103(a)‟s obviousness requirement.
61
  Both of these requirements of patenta-
  
 51. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 52. I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 160 (5th ed. 
2010); see also Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
395, 412 (2009) (“Agencies are especially important when legal directives are re-
quired to guide people‟s behavior but neither Congress nor the courts are able to regu-
late with sufficient clarity.”). 
 53. I PIERCE, supra note 52, at 160; see also Mazzone, supra note 52, at 412 
(“Congress often lacks the institutional capacity (or the will) to determine how a stat-
ute will apply on the ground and in a variety of contexts.”). 
 54. I PIERCE, supra note 52, at 502 (“Sometimes, however, Congress explicitly 
requires an agency to resolve some issues through issuance of legislative rules.”); see 
also Mazzone, supra note 52, at 412 (“Administrative agencies fill these voids.”). 
 55. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40. 
 56. Id. at 840. 
 57. Id. at 864-66. 
 58. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (describing the oath the patent applicant 
must make and before whom the oath may be given). 
 59. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1751 
(2011). 
 60. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (listing patentable subject matter as covering processes, 
machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof). 
 61. Id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
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bility left inventors, the patent bar, and technological industries searching for 
answers as to what these statutory provisions meant and what limits could be 
placed on them.
62
  These are two of the many gaps in patent law that must be 
fleshed out.
63
   
Although Congress has left it to the courts and not administrative agen-
cies to fill these voids in the Patent Act,
64
 these gaps are similar to the gaps in 
other legislative acts, which Congress delegates its authority to administrative 
agencies to fill.  For example, in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966,
65
 Congress delegated its authority to regulate motor vehi-
cle safety standards to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
66
  
Congress‟s statutory guidance to the agency was that “[e]ach such Federal 
motor vehicle safety standard shall be practicable, shall meet the need for 
motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.”
67
  Congress also 
directed that the agency should consider relevant motor vehicle safety data; 
should consult with the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission and, if appro-
priate, other agencies; should consider whether the standard is reasonable, 
practicable, and appropriate and should consider how the standards will carry 
out the purpose of the Act.
68
 
The benefit of permitting Congress to delegate policymaking and rule-
making to agencies is that Congress, which cannot be expected to have inti-
mate knowledge in every area that it regulates, gets to take advantage of 
  
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.  Patenta-
bility shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”). 
 62. See Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 639-40 
(2008) (describing the patentable subject matter categories of section 101 of the Pa-
tent Act as vague or ambiguous); see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The 
Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1593-94 & n.8 (2011) 
("The basic rule of nonobviousness is easy enough to recite . . . . But the apparent 
simplicity of the requirement belies the complexities and difficulties that have histori-
cally bedeviled the doctrine."). 
 63. Even though the Supreme Court has recently addressed both of these issues, 
in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) and KSR International Co. v. Tele-
flex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007), these decisions have not provided any more meat 
on the bones of the Patent Act.  Arguably, they undid some of the fleshing out that the 
Federal Circuit had previously done. 
 64. Burstein, supra note 59, at 1751. 
 65. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 
80 Stat. 718. 
 66. Id. § 103, 80 Stat. at 719-20 (via further delegation by the Secretary of 
Commerce). 
 67. Id. § 103(a), 80 Stat. at 719. 
 68. Id. § 103(f), 80 Stat. at 719. 
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agencies‟ expertise in their particular fields.
69
  Thus, the agency with exper-
tise in the field can craft rules and implement policies that best reflect the 
needs of that field and its stakeholders. 
For an agency to issue a rule that has the force and effect of law and be 
binding on the courts and the public, Congress must have delegated to the 
agency legislative authority to issue the rule,
70
 and the agency must have 
complied with the notice and comment provisions of section 553 of the 
APA.
71
  For present purposes, only the notice and comment procedures need 
be addressed.  The authority to issue legislative rules will be addressed later.
72
  
Section 553 of the APA sets forth a three-part process for informal substan-
tive rulemaking:
73
 (1) issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) receiving 
and considering comments on the proposed rule, and (3) issuing the final rule 
incorporating a statement of its basis and purpose.
74
 
The Federal Circuit‟s numerous en banc hearings to set forth rules re-
garding a wide range of issues and sub-issues, and which consequently set 
patent policy, are analogous to administrative agencies‟ procedures for infor-
mal substantive rulemaking.  When an agency issues notice of a proposed 
rulemaking, the agency must provide notice of “the terms or substance of the 
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”
75
  Typi-
cally, when the Federal Circuit hears a case en banc, it issues an order for 
rehearing en banc letting the parties and public know it will be addressing an 
issue or several issues.
76
  Of course, the Federal Circuit does not announce its 
proposed rule in the order, but its statement of subjects and issues appears to 
satisfy the APA‟s requirements.  Phillips, Therasense, and Ariad, discussed 
supra, are good examples of meeting this standard.
77
   
In addition, an agency‟s notice must establish the time, place, and nature 
of the rulemaking proceeding.
78
  Again, the Federal Circuit‟s orders for re-
  
 69. See Mazzone, supra note 52, at 412 (“Congress often lacks the institutional 
capacity (or the will) to determine how a statute will apply on the ground and in a 
variety of contexts.”). 
 70. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979). 
 71. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 72. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. 
 73. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.  Formal rulemaking is similar to informal rulemaking but 
requires the agency to conduct an oral evidentiary hearing.  I PIERCE, supra note 52, 
at 558.  Informal rulemaking is the most common form of administrative rulemaking.  
Formal rulemaking is increasingly rare.  Id.. 
 74. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c); see also I PIERCE, supra note 52, at 406. 
 75. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). 
 76. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App‟x 35 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); In re Bilski, 264 F. App‟x 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43. 
 78. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1). 
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hearing en banc would meet this requirement by letting the parties and amici 
know that they may submit briefs to the court in support of their proposed 
rule and giving the timeline for when the briefs are due.
79
  Finally, the agen-
cy‟s notice must give legal authority for the rule.
80
  This requirement calls for 
the reference to “apprise interested persons of the agency‟s legal authority to 
issue the proposed rule.”
81
  Although the Federal Circuit does not cite to the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 as giving the Federal Circuit au-
thority to hear patent appeals,
82
 no one seriously doubts the Federal Circuit‟s 
authority to create patent rules to give meaning to the Patent Act.  In short, 
the notice requirement‟s purpose is to give interested members of the public 
an opportunity to comment in a meaningful way.
83
  The Federal Circuit‟s 
practice of issuing an en banc order specifying the questions the court seeks 
to address and permitting the parties and amici to file briefs accomplishes this 
goal. 
After an agency has issued proper notice, the agency must give interest-
ed parties the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process by submit-
ting their views or arguments with or without an opportunity for oral presen-
tation.
84
  The Federal Circuit‟s en banc practice mimics this APA requirement 
for informal substantive rulemaking.  By freely permitting amici to file briefs 
without seeking leave of the court
85
 and to present oral arguments in limited 
circumstances,
86
 the Federal Circuit has opened its patent rulemaking and 
policy setting procedure to the public and seeks their participation as it de-
termines what rule or rules should be adopted. 
After considering the public‟s comments, an agency must incorporate 
into its rule a concise general statement of its basis and purpose.
87
  The Fed-
eral Circuit performs the equivalent of this function when it issues its en banc 
  
 79. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc., 374 F. App‟x at 36 (“Appellants‟ en banc brief is 
due 45 days from the date of this order.  The en banc response brief is due within 30 
days of service of the appellants‟ new en banc brief, and the reply brief within 10 days 
of service of the response brief.”); In re Bilski, 264 F. App‟x 896 (“The parties shall 
file simultaneous supplemental briefs which are due in the court within 20 days from 
the date of filing of this order, i.e., on March 6, 2008. . . . Any amicus briefs will be 
due 30 days thereafter.”). 
 80. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2). 
 81. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL‟S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 29 (1947). 
 82. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 163(b)(2), 
96 Stat. 25, 50 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 83. I PIERCE, supra note 52, at 571. 
 84. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. 
 86. See Oral Argument, In re Bilski, 264 F. App‟x 896 (2007-1130), available at 
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/Audiomp3/2007-1130-2.mp3 (permitting oral 
argument by Professor John Duffy and William Lee as amici). 
 87. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
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opinion in the case.  The opinion describes the rule the court has adopted,
88
 
describes how it arrived at its rule,
89
 and describes what purpose the rule 
serves.
90
 
In sum, like the agencies that promulgate rules and consequently estab-
lish or change policy in their fields, the Federal Circuit‟s en banc announce-
ment of broad rules establishes and forms patent policy.  And like the agen-
cies who must follow the APA‟s requirements for their rules to have the force 
and effect of law, the Federal Circuit seems to follow those same procedures 
when hearing a case en banc.
91
 
IV.  A NORMATIVE EVALUATION 
Having now established that when the Federal Circuit hears cases en 
banc its course of conduct looks strikingly similar to substantive rulemaking 
by agencies, the question becomes a normative one – should the Federal Cir-
cuit be doing this?  This Part first examines two objections to the Federal 
Circuit‟s en banc practices: a separation of powers concern and a lack of 
meaningful review of the Federal Circuit‟s rules.  Next, this Part examines the 
alternative choices to determine if they would be better at directing patent 
policy than would the Federal Circuit. 
A.  Separation of Powers 
The primary objection to the Federal Circuit‟s en banc conduct is a sepa-
ration of powers concern – that courts should not set policy.  Judge Plager, of 
the Federal Circuit no less, has emphasized strongly that even when courts 
are called on to interpret broadly worded statutory provisions that may have 
policy implications, a court‟s “choices are constrained by the central policies 
reflected in the basic legislative scheme, as well as by the self-imposed defer-
  
 88. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“In sum, we hold, as a general proposition, that asserting the advice of counsel de-
fense and disclosing opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel.”). 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 1372-75 (recognizing different approaches and citing to an 
analogous Supreme Court case for support). 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 1374 (describing the purpose of the attorney-client privilege 
and how waiver of the privilege with respect to opinion counsel should not be deemed 
waiver of the privilege with respect to trial counsel because communication with trial 
counsel would have little relevance to the issue of pre-litigation willfulness). 
 91. To be sure, agencies can also make “rules” and set policy via case-by-case 
adjudication.  I PIERCE, supra note 52, at 495.  And although the Federal Circuit adju-
dicates cases in a way similar to agencies adjudicating cases, what makes the Federal 
Circuit‟s en banc practices more analogous to traditional agency rulemaking is that it 
engages in this notice and comment-like activity.   
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ence to the policy-fulfilling role of the executive branch.”
92
  Judge Plager 
describes the court‟s limited role in the policy-setting arena as exercising 
some judgment in discerning Congress‟s purpose, while emphasizing that the 
court‟s role is “not to assess the extent to which the congressional policy is 
responsive to current problems or to determine how well-tuned the statute is 
to subtle changes in people‟s behavior or market conditions.”
93
 
With respect to the Federal Circuit setting patent policy, Judge Plager 
asserts that the Federal Circuit exists to apply the law and not balance the 
policy levers because the Federal Circuit is without the proper tools for doing 
so.
94
  In making his point, Judge Plager raises the following rhetorical ques-
tions:  
Suppose the judges of the Federal Circuit come to the conclusion that 
the balance Congress has struck is wrong with regard to a particular 
field of endeavor . . . .   Suppose [the Federal Circuit] conclude[s] that 
[the relevant provision] is stifling competition, and needs tweaking . . . 
. How are the judges to make this assessment?  Read newspaper and 
law review articles?  Hold public hearings?  Ask litigants to brief and 
argue the question?
95
 
The Federal Circuit seems to have answered affirmatively the last two 
rhetorical questions, at least with respect to cases heard en banc.
96
  The Fed-
eral Circuit, in announcing broad questions and inviting the parties and amici 
to file briefs, appears to be doing exactly what Judge Plager says the court 
cannot and should not do.  The fact that the court sua sponte orders cases to 
be heard en banc 48-56% of the time
97
 underscores Judge Plager‟s concern.  
To be sure, the percentage of cases heard en banc and ordered sua sponte do 
not, in and of themselves, indicate that the Federal Circuit is engaging in pol-
icymaking.  But these factors, combined with the exhaustive scope or number 
of questions the Federal Circuit seeks to address, strongly suggests that the 
Federal Circuit sets patent policy.   
Still, Judge Plager raises a valid separation of powers objection to courts 
refusing to exercise self-restraint in deciding matters of policy.  But regard-
less of whether it is desirable or undesirable for appellate courts to set policy, 
  
 92. S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2007). 
 93. Id. at 1737-38 (noting that during oral arguments in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & 
T Corp., Justice Breyer chastised the Federal Circuit for trying to bring the Patent Act 
up to date with technology). 
 94. Id. at 1741-42. 
 95. Id. at 1742 (emphasis added). 
 96. See supra Part III. 
 97. See supra Part II.  
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it is well accepted that they do so.
98
  Thus, we should look beyond, but not 
forget, the separation of powers concern and examine other avenues of evalu-
ating the Federal Circuit‟s en banc practices. 
B.  Lack of Review 
Another critique of the Federal Circuit‟s en banc rulemaking and conse-
quent policy-setting is that, unlike administrative rulemaking, no meaningful 
backstop of judicial review for the Federal Circuit exists.  If an agency en-
gages in substantive rulemaking to flesh out a broadly-worded legislative 
rule, then those entities with standing have the ability to challenge the agen-
cy‟s rules and can have the courts analyze them to ensure the agency has not 
overstepped its bounds.
99
  This same level of protection does not exist when 
the Federal Circuit engages in the same type of activity.  Of course, the par-
ties involved in an en banc hearing have the option of filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court,
100
 but this alternative is inadequate.  
The Supreme Court is not accessible to everyone with an interest like the 
lower courts are.
101
  Almost all appeals to the Supreme Court are now granted 
by means of the discretionary writ of certiorari.
102
  Of the Supreme Court‟s 
approximately eighty to ninety cases it decides annually, it averages about 
one or two patent cases.
103
 
  
 98. See judicialnetwork, Sotomayor: Judges make policy, YOUTUBE (May 12, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXS6AoNCr_Q (“court of appeals is where 
policy is made . . . and I know I should never say that because we don‟t make law, 
[followed by laughter erupting from the audience] . . . I‟m not promoting it, I‟m not 
advocating it, I‟m . . . you know [followed by more laughter]”). 
 99. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‟n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983).  In State Farm, State Farm challenged the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration‟s regulation revoking its prior regulation 
requiring passive restraints in vehicles.  Id. at 39-40.  The Supreme Court held that the 
revocation was arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 46. 
 100. Judiciary Act of 1925, 68 Pub. L. No. 415, § 237, 43 Stat. 936, 937-38. 
 101. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-59 (2006). 
 102. 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 
4001, 4004 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2011). 
 103. During the 2010-2011 Term, the Supreme Court decided three patent cases – 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), Board of Trustees 
of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188 (2011); and Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).  
During the 2009-2010 Term, the Supreme Court decided one patent case – Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  During the 2008-2009 Term, the Supreme Court did 
not decide any patent cases.  See David Carlson, Supreme Court 2008-2009 Term 
Highlights, CORNELL U. L. SCH., http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/supreme_court 
_2008-2009_term_highlights (last visited July 14, 2011).  During the 2007-2008 
Term, the Supreme Court decided one patent case – Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).  The 2006-2007 Term had more Supreme 
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C.  Alternative Choices 
Despite the separation of powers concerns and the lack of review of the 
Federal Circuit‟s en banc rulemaking and policy-setting, a need undoubtedly 
exists for an entity to set patent policy.  Looking at the other players in the 
patent policy arena, the Federal Circuit may be the best candidate, and its en 
banc approach to setting patent policy may not be that objectionable.  This 
section examines the abilities of Congress, the Supreme Court, the district 
courts, and the PTO to shape patent policy as alternatives or complements to 
the Federal Circuit sitting en banc. 
1.  Congress‟s Capability for Patent Policy 
From a separation of powers perspective, Congress ideally would step in 
and set patent policy.  But since its enactment in 1952, Congress has shown 
little interest in amending the Patent Act.  When it has shown interest, the 
amendments have pertained primarily to procedural or administrative is-
sues.
104
  For the past several years, Congress has introduced patent reform 
legislation but has never passed it.
105
  The 112
th
 Congress again introduced 
patent reform legislation
106
 and was finally able to pass this legislation in both 
  
Court involvement in patent cases, but still it only decided three cases – Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007), KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 U.S. 398 (2007), and  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 104. Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1965, 1968 (2009). 
 105. See, e.g., S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us 
/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-515 (reported by the committee, but never voted on by 
the Senate); S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us 
/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-610 (referred, but not reported by the committee); H.R. 
1260, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd? 
bill=h111-1260 (referred, but not reported by the committee); S. 3600, 110th Cong. 
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-3600 (re-
ferred, but not reported by the committee); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007), available 
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (passed the House, but 
not voted on by the Senate); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (reported by the committee, but never 
voted on by the Senate); S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3818 (referred, but not reported by the com-
mittee); H.R. 2955, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/ con-
gress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2955 (reported by the committee, but never voted on by the 
House). 
 106. See S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=s112-23; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (passed by the Senate on September 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd? bill=h112-1249. 
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chambers in September of 2011.
107
  And although President Obama has now 
signed it into law, the reform will play a minor role in addressing the larger, 
looming patent policy issues.  The amendments do make some major changes 
to patent law, including moving the United States to a first-to-file system,
108
 
eliminating the best mode requirement as a basis for asserting invalidity of a 
patent,
109
 and eliminating tax strategies from being patentable.
110
  Although 
these reforms are significant policy changes, they are only a small part of the 
tremendous amount of patent policy issues that need to be addressed.  In sum, 
although Congress has recently passed patent reform after several years of 
being unable to muster the political will to do so, much work remains to be 
done. 
2.  The Supreme Court‟s Capability for Patent Policy 
The next potential body that could set patent policy is the Supreme 
Court.  Although the Supreme Court has shown an increased interest in patent 
cases over the past decade,
111
 it is an ineffective body to direct patent policy.  
First, as discussed supra, the Supreme Court hears only a small handful of 
patent cases each Term.
112
  Second, the Supreme Court has little expertise in 
patent law and is therefore not the most knowledgeable institution in terms of 
the nuances of patent law and the ramifications its rules may have.
113
  In 
short, unless the Supreme Court significantly and consistently increases the 
number of patent cases it hears each Term, a highly unlikely event, it cannot 
play a major role in developing patent policy.  
3.  The District Courts‟ Capability for Patent Policy 
Another policy-setting body could be the federal district courts, which 
are also unlikely to be a good choice.  The most obvious problem with using 
  
 107. Dennis Crouch, Smith-Leahy America Invents Act to Become Law – Senate 
Passes H.R. 1249 Without Amendment, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/smith-leahy-america-invents-act-to-
become-law-senate-passes-hr-1249-without-amendment.html. 
 108. H.R. 1249 § 3. 
 109. Id. § 15. 
 110. Id. § 14. 
 111. See Ryan Vacca, IP and the Supreme Court: A Historical Perspective at 5 
(Table 1) (unpublished manuscript) (Nov. 5, 2010) (on file with the author) (illustrat-
ing that from 2001-2010 1.9% of the Supreme Court‟s docket has consisted of patent 
cases (2.0% when including the 2010-2011 Term) compared with 0.8% from 1991-
2000 and 0.3% from 1981-1990). 
 112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 113. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription 
for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 688-89 
(2009). 
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district courts is structural; they have no authority to bind other district courts, 
the Federal Circuit, or the Supreme Court.  Moreover, like the Supreme 
Court, district court judges infrequently hear patent cases.
114
  This lack of 
experience makes them ill-suited to set patent policy.   
Earlier this year, Congress passed and President Obama signed House 
Bill 628, which establishes a ten-year pilot program for some district court 
judges electing to hear patent cases; the bill allows judges to gain further ex-
perience by channeling patent cases to them.
115
  Although some hope exists 
that these district court judges will, over time, become more knowledgeable 
about patent law, there is cause for concern that this pilot program is not go-
ing to create the level of specialization that was anticipated.  In its original 
form, the bill annually appropriated $5,000,000 for educational and profes-
sional development about patents for the participating district judges and for 
compensation for law clerks with expertise in technical matters.
116
  However, 
as passed, the appropriations provision was removed.
117
  Although some dis-
trict court judges may elect to specialize in patent cases within their district, 
the fact that additional funds are unavailable to educate these judges on mat-
ters relating to patent law makes it less likely that these district court judges 
will, in fact, become specialists. 
4.  The PTO‟s Capability for Patent Policy 
The final potential candidate in the patent law arena for setting patent 
law policy is the PTO.  Although Congress regularly delegates its rulemaking 
and policy-setting authority in highly complex areas to administrative agen-
cies, Congress has not delegated this authority to the PTO.
118
  Currently, the 
PTO‟s only rulemaking authority is to set regulations governing the conduct 
of proceedings in the PTO.
119
  The Federal Circuit repeatedly has rejected 
claims that the PTO has authority to engage in substantive rulemaking.
120
   
  
 114. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to 
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1097 & n.277 (2003) (“estimating 
that the average judge has only one patent trial every 6 to 8 years”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 115. See Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 
3674 (2011). 
 116. H.B. 628, 111th Cong. § 1(f)(1) (2009). 
 117. See 124 Stat. 3674. 
 118. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What 
Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 838 (2010). 
 119. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 120. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quot-
ing Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (“As we 
have previously held, the broadest of the PTO‟s rulemaking powers . . . authorizes the 
Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to „the conduct of proceedings 
in the [PTO]‟; it does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive 
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The House of Representatives attempted to grant the PTO authority to 
issue substantive rules in the Patent Reform Act of 2007 by granting the Di-
rector of the PTO the power to “promulgate such rules, regulations, and or-
ders that the Director determines appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
this title or any other law applicable to the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office or that the Director determines necessary to govern the operation 
and organization of the Office.”
121
  Despite this effort to give the PTO the 
ability to engage in substantive rulemaking and help set patent policy, the 
Senate never voted on the Patent Reform Act of 2007; consequently, the Act 
never became law.
122
  The current patent reform legislation does not contain a 
provision granting substantive rulemaking authority.
123
  As a result of this 
lack of Congressional authority, any substantive rules the PTO promulgates 
do not have the force and effect of law but are interpretive rules that may be 
persuasive when viewed in light of “the thoroughness of its consideration and 
the validity of its reasoning.”
124
 
The PTO‟s lack of substantive rulemaking authority may be reasonable.  
Certainly, the PTO has a vast amount of experience with patents.  It works 
directly with innovators and spends much of its time applying the Patent 
Act‟s provisions to patent applications.
125
  Nonetheless, the PTO may lack an 
institutional competence for patent policymaking.  The bulk of the PTO‟s 
expertise is technological in nature
126
 and not in establishing patent policy.  
This technical expertise does not imply that the PTO would be better at set-
ting patent policy than the Federal Circuit sitting en banc.
127
  Until last year, 
the PTO did not employ any economists, whose expertise could be particular-
ly helpful in establishing patent policy.
128
  Therefore, although an administra-
  
rules.”); see also Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We agree with 
the district court that § 2(b)(2) „does not vest the USPTO with any general substantive 
rulemaking power.‟”), vacated by 328 F. App‟x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 121. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 11 (2007) (as introduced in the House). 
 122. See Long, supra note 104, at 1979. 
 123. See S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=s112-23; H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-1249. 
 124. Merck & Co., 80 F.3d at 1550. 
 125. Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 127, 192 (2000) (“PTO employees undoubtedly gain a „hands-on‟ 
view of the patent system by reviewing hundreds of thousands of patent applications 
every year . . . .”). 
 126. See Burstein, supra note 59, at 1787-88. 
 127. Id. (“[I]t is unclear how this experience places the PTO in a better position 
than anyone else to evaluate what changes in legal rules will best encourage re-
search.”); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing 
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 792-93 (2004). 
 128. Rai, supra note 114, at 1132 (arguing that “there are reasons to be wary 
about granting the PTO substantive rulemaking authority.”).  In March 2010, the 
USPTO established the Office of Chief Economist and appointed Dr. Stuart Graham 
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tive agency exists in the patent field, there may be less reason to defer to its 
ability to establish patent rules, and consequently, to strike a proper balance 
between protection of and access to innovation. 
Despite the PTO‟s perceived lack of institutional competence to estab-
lish substantive rules and set patent policy, the PTO has had an impact on the 
Federal Circuit‟s rulemaking and policy setting.  The PTO has issued guide-
lines and interpretive rules, which the Federal Circuit tends to give deference 
to when crafting its rules.
 
  For example, in 1995 and again in 2001, the PTO 
issued its Utility Examination Guidelines
129
 to govern its internal practices for 
determining whether the applicant had satisfied the utility requirement under 
section 101.
130
  During an appeal from the PTO‟s rejection of an application 
for lack of utility, the Federal Circuit noted that the guidelines were not bind-
ing but could be “given judicial notice to the extent they do not conflict with 
the statute.”
131
  Finding that the guidelines were consistent with precedent, 
the Federal Circuit used them to support its holding that no specific utility 
existed.
132
 
Thus, the PTO may be fulfilling its unauthorized role as an agency set-
ting patent policy; and therefore, it may be complementing or balancing the 
Federal Circuit‟s en banc role.  Nonetheless, the lack of authority and ability 
to have its guidelines or interpretations necessarily afforded the force and 
effect of law renders the PTO a secondary player in the patent policy arena. 
Of course, this is not to say that the PTO, if given the authority and re-
sources to employ capable personnel, could not do a good job or even a better 
job at setting patent policy than the Federal Circuit could do.
133
  In fact, the 
PTO (or even a different agency) might be preferable in terms of setting pa-
tent policy.  Agencies have the ability to engage in more substantial fact-
  
as its first Chief Economist.  Office of Chief Economist, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/index.jsp (last visited July 14, 
2011).  This is a step in the right direction if it is determined that the PTO should be 
setting patent policy. 
 129. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 130. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 131. Id. (quoting Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe, 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)). 
 132. Id. at 1372-73. (“Indeed, we note that Example 9 of the PTO‟s „Revised 
Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials‟ is applicable to the facts here.  In that 
example, a cDNA fragment disclosed as being useful as a probe to obtain the full 
length gene corresponding to a cDNA fragment was deemed to lack a specific and 
substantial utility.  Additionally, the MPEP particularly explains that a claim directed 
to a polynucleotide disclosed to be useful as a „gene probe‟ or „chromosome marker,‟ 
as is the case here, fails to satisfy the specific utility requirement unless a specific 
DNA target is also disclosed.”) (citation omitted). 
 133. Burstein, supra note 59, at 1787-88 (“The PTO is set up primarily to perform 
the tasks of patent examination, which . . . are distinct from policymaking.  But it does 
not follow from these observations that no agency properly constituted could make 
patent policy successfully.”). 
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finding than courts, which can place them in a superior position to set poli-
cy.
134
  But as with any administrative agency, the risks of "tunnel-vision" and 
"capture" exist.
135
  With tunnel-vision, the regulators, who encounter the 
same issues over time, lose their ability to think outside the box or rethink 
established rules.
136
  With capture, the concern is that over time regulators 
will move toward the interests of those they regulate because of the resources 
used by the regulated industries.
137
  Several commentators believe capture 
exists at the PTO, while others believe the powerful players on all sides of 
patent policy questions tend to cancel out the influence by the others.
138
 
5.  The Federal Circuit‟s Capability for Patent Policy 
Having eliminated Congress, the Supreme Court, and the district courts 
as options to be effective patent policymakers, and by Congress failing to 
give the PTO authority to do so, we are left with slim pickings.  By process of 
elimination, the Federal Circuit is the only entity remaining.  Despite the sep-
aration of powers and lack of review objections, the Federal Circuit as patent 
policymaker may not be a horrible choice.  Unlike the Supreme Court and 
district courts, 30 to 40% of the Federal Circuit‟s docket is comprised of pa-
tent cases, resulting in it hearing several hundred patent cases per year.
139
  
And unlike Congress, based on the Federal Circuit‟s practices over the last 
twenty-nine years, the Federal Circuit appears as though it is willing and in-
terested in setting patent policy, especially recently.
140
  But perhaps most 
important is that by using its en banc procedure and regularly inviting the 
parties and amici to file briefs, the Federal Circuit is establishing patent rules 
and setting patent policy in an inclusive way.   
Expertise and inclusiveness are the two most desirable characteristics in 
administrative rulemaking.
141
  The Federal Circuit‟s en banc practice in the 
patent context seems to embody these desirable characteristics and further 
democratic principles in light of Congress‟s delegation of its policymaking 
duty to the courts via their adjudicatory role.  Despite these positive charac-
teristics, policymaking by the Federal Circuit is no panacea.  Just as with 
agencies, concern exists that the Federal Circuit is subject to capture and tun-
nel vision.
142
 
  
 134. Id. at 1785-88. 
 135. Id. at 1795-96. 
 136. Id. at 1795. 
 137. Id. at 1795-96. 
 138. Id. at 1796-97. 
 139. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
 140. See supra Part II. 
 141. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (expertise); I PIERCE, supra note 
52, at 571 (inclusiveness).  Expertise has been explained, but inclusiveness seems to 
reflect some degree of democracy when compared to policymaking via adjudication. 
 142. Burstein, supra note 59, at 1797-98. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Congress may have thought it was creating an appellate court when it 
established the Federal Circuit.  Instead, Congress created a court that, when 
it sits en banc, has administrative agency-like tendencies.  To a certain extent, 
this result was Congress‟s own doing.  By drafting a broadly-worded Patent 
Act, it delegated its duty to set rules and policies.  By not giving the PTO 
authority to promulgate substantive rules and by not taking an interest in or 
having the institutional capacity to do so itself, Congress left it to the courts 
to flesh out rules and direct patent policy.  The Supreme Court‟s limited expe-
rience and shrinking docket render it an inapt body, and the district courts do 
not fare any better given their limited experience with patent cases and their 
position within the judicial hierarchy. 
As a result, the only institution that could handle the task was the Feder-
al Circuit.  Fortunately, it has been willing to undertake this responsibility, 
and when sitting en banc, it undertakes this obligation in a responsible and 
inclusive way.  Although the Federal Circuit‟s en banc practices strongly 
resemble an agency‟s procedure for substantive rulemaking, these character-
istics are ones that are admired in today‟s administrative state.  That being the 
case, the Federal Circuit is not always consistent in following the notice and 
comment procedures.
143
  Given the benefits of the notice and comment pro-
cedures being followed and the objections to the Federal Circuit‟s rulemaking 
and policy setting, the Federal Circuit would be wise to continue its notice 
and comment-like practices for all en banc cases.  In fact, it may be advisable 
for the Federal Circuit to sit en banc more frequently. 
To be sure, more changes in patent law and policy are on the horizon.  
Congress, the Supreme Court, the district courts, and the PTO may, and per-
haps should, have a larger role in how these changes come about.  But until 
structural changes are made or enough political will is garnered, the Federal 
Circuit hearing cases en banc is not a bad solution to the ever-present prob-
lem of changing circumstances in patent law. 
  
 143. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(Newman, J. dissenting) (“The court has given no notice of this impending en banc 
action, contrary to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and contrary to the Fed-
eral Circuit‟s own operating procedures.  The en banc court has received no briefing 
and held no argument, although the Federal Rules so require.  The communities of 
inventors, innovators, and the public who may be affected by this change of law have 
had no opportunity to be heard.  The court has received no information concerning the 
effect on patents that were granted based on this long-established practice, no advice 
on what kinds of inventions may now lie fallow because they are unprotected.  Nor 
does the court explain its suspension of the standards of judicial process.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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APPENDIX 
Chronological List of Federal Circuit Cases Ordered or Heard En Banc: 
1982-2011
144
 
No. Case Name Year 
Sua Sponte or  
Petitioned 
No. of  
Questions 
1 
Atari, Inc. v. JS & A 
Group, Inc. 1984 sua sponte 2 
2 
Gardner v. TEC Systems, 
Inc. 1984 unknown unknown 
3 In re Bennett 1985 sua sponte unknown 
4 In re Etter 1985 sua sponte 2 
5 Paulik v. Rizkalla 1985 unknown unknown 
6 
SRI International v. 
Matsushita Electric Corp. 
of America 1985 sua sponte unknown 
7 
Wyden v. Commissioner 
of Patents and Trade-
marks 1986 unknown unknown 
8 
Pennwalt Corp. v. Du-
rand-Wayland, Inc. 1987 sua sponte unknown 
9 
Woodard v. Sage Prod-
ucts, Inc. 1987 petitioned unknown 
10 Gavin v. Star Brite Corp. 1988 sua sponte unknown 
11 
Kingsdown Medical Con-
sultants, Ltd. v. Hollister 
Inc. 1988 sua sponte 4 
12 In re Roberts 1988 sua sponte unknown 
13 
Racing Strollers, Inc. v. 
TRI Industries, Inc. 1989 petitioned 1 
  
 144. This list of cases excludes Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 
175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1982), which was the first opinion from the Federal Circuit and which adopted as 
precedent the decisions of the Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals.  Midwest has been excluded because it is more of a trademark case rather than a 
patent case.  See Midwest Indus., Inc., 175 F.3d at 1357.  South Corp. has been ex-
cluded because, although it has patent ramifications, the case itself is not a patent 
case.  See S. Corp., 690 F.2d at 1369.  Also excluded from this list are Wyden v. 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (deciding 
an issue concerning the regulation of patent agents rather than a substantive patent 
issue) and In re Roberts, 846 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (addressing the ability of the 
Federal Circuit to direct a district court to ignore an order from the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit). 
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14 
Aerojet-General Corp. v. 
Machine Tool Works, 
Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd. 1990 sua sponte 1 
15 
Beatrice Foods Co. v. 
New England Printing 
and Lithographing Co. 1990 unknown unknown 
16 In re Dillon 1990 petitioned unknown 
17 
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. 
R.L. Chaides Construc-
tion Co. 1992 sua sponte 3 
18 In re Alappat 1994 sua sponte 3 
19 In re Donaldson Co.  1994 petitioned unknown 
20 
Hilton Davis Chem Co. v. 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. 1995 sua sponte 3 
21 
Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc. 1995 sua sponte 4 
22 
King Instrument Corp. v. 
Perego N/A sua sponte unknown 
23 
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley 
Co. 1995 sua sponte unknown 
24 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc. 1998 sua sponte unknown 
25 In re Zurko 1998 petitioned 1 
26 
Nobelpharma AB v. Im-
plant Innovations, Inc. 1998 unknown unknown 
27 
Festo  Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co. (Festo 2000) 2000 petitioned 5 
28 
Johnson & Johnston As-
sociates Inc. v. R.E. Ser-
vice Co. 2002 sua sponte 2 
29 
Festo  Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co. (Festo 2003) 2003 unknown 4 
30 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme 
Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge 
GmbH v. Dana Corp. 2004 sua sponte 4 
31 
Honeywell International 
Inc. v. Hamilton 
Sundstrand Corp. 2004 sua sponte unknown 
32 Phillips v. AWH Corp. 2005 petitioned 7 
33 
DSU Medical Corp. v. 
JMS Co. 2006 unknown unknown 
34 In re Seagate 2007 sua sponte 3 
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35 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. 
Swisa, Inc.  2008 petitioned 3 
36 In re Bilski 2008 sua sponte 5 
37 
Abbott Laboratories v. 
Sandoz, Inc. 2009 sua sponte unknown 
38 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. 
v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. 2009 petitioned 1 
39 Tafas v. Doll N/A petitioned unknown 
40 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 2010 petitioned 2 
41 Princo Corp. v. ITC 2010 petitioned unknown 
42 Hyatt v. Kappos 2010 petitioned 4 
43 
Therasense, Inc. v. Bec-
ton, Dickinson & Co. 2011 petitioned 6 
44 
TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar 
Corp. 2011 petitioned 4 
45 
Akamai Technologies, 
Inc. v. MIT N/A petitioned 1 
46 
McKesson Technologies 
Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp. N/A petitioned 2 
 
 
